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Abstract 
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand 
as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special 
conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 
14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to 
human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of 
special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 
5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a 
technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New 
Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its 
importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, 
required. 
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I Introduction 
The internet was conceived in the early 70s and since then it has grown exponentially.1 
Today, nearly three billion people use the internet worldwide, including the overwhelming 
majority of the New Zealand population.2 It has proved an indispensable tool for 
communication and accessing information and as such, it has fundamentally changed the 
way people enjoy their right to freedom of expression. One may now seek, receive or impart 
information instantaneously and inexpensively to and from a global audience.3  
In 2013 a study showed that 92 percent of New Zealanders used the internet4 while 80 
percent of homes had an internet connection in 2012.5 The 2013 study also revealed that 
73 percent of New Zealanders felt that the internet was important in their everyday lives.6 
This is in line with a trend that has been growing over the last decade, and is set to continue 
with increasing emphasis being placed on it by all sectors, including government.7 The 
iGovt login system, an attempt to homogenise the login system of government websites, is 
one example of government acknowledgement of the importance of the internet as a 
communication tool, and a growing interface on which the public relies.8 The 2013 study 
showed that 81% of people view the internet as an important provider of information, 
which is a substantially higher proportion than any other information source.9  
However, like all technological developments, the internet may be abused to cause harm 
to others.10 There have already been cases of internet-related crime ranging from terrorism 
  
1 Barry Leiner and others “Brief History of the Internet” (accessed 2014) Internet Society 
www.internetsociety.org  
2 Internet Live Stats “Internet Users” (2014) Internet Live Stats www.internetlivestats.com  
3 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue (Human Rights Council, 17th session, 16 May 
2011, A/HRC/17/27) at [19].  
4 C Crothers and others (2014) Internet Trends In New Zealand 2007-2013 Auckland, New Zealand: Institute 
of Culture, Discourse and Communication, Auckland University of Technology at 7.  
5 Geoff Bascand “Household Use of Information and Communication Technology: 2012” (2013) Statistics 
New Zealand at 1.   
6 Crothers, above n 4, at 9.  
7 Crothers, above n 4, at 2, 9.  
8 Susy Frankel, Deborah Ryder (eds) and Petra Butler Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in a 
Global World (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 519. 
9 Crothers, above n 4, at 10. 
10 La Rue, above n 3, at [69].  
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to copyright infringement, with blackmail, privacy invasions and child pornography falling 
in between.11 Globally, courts have reacted to the use of the internet as an instrument in 
crime by restricting access to it as a special condition of sentencing for internet-related 
crimes. In New Zealand these conditions have thus far consisted mainly of minor 
restrictions, requiring supervision or permission to access the internet, but both the United 
Kingdom and the United States have had total restrictions of internet access judicially 
imposed.12 In the New Zealand cases where these conditions have been applied, there has 
been no discussion of their legality in regards to inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (BORA).13 
 
This paper asserts that internet access is protected within the scope of freedom of 
expression as an implied right belonging to every person, and that judicial restriction of it 
as a sentencing condition is an apparent breach of s 14 of BORA. It qualifies this implied 
right as the right to access the internet free from state interference, rather than an obligation 
on the state to provide internet access publicly. It then discusses whether either partial or 
full restrictions of an individual’s internet access are legitimised as demonstrably justified 
limitations under s 5 BORA. A judge’s power to impose conditions restricting internet 
access is constrained due to their obligation to take BORA into account when applying the 
Sentencing Act.14 It concludes by exploring some the practical implications of such 
restrictions and possible reforms to increase protection of internet access and the clarity of 
the laws conferring that protection. 
  
  
11 See: R v Darrell [2013] NZHC 1860; Wilson v New Zealand Parole Board [2013] NZHC 1789; AM v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486 (Admin);  United States of America v 
Dotcom [2013] NZCA 38 
12 AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2486 (Admin); United States v Mitnick, 
145 F.3d 1342, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343 (9th Cir. May 14, 1998) 
13 See: R v Darrell [2013] NZHC 1860; Wilson v New Zealand Parole Board [2013] NZHC 1789.  
14 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Singapore, 2003) at 
141.  
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II Protection of Internet Access in New Zealand 
There is no explicit statutory protection of internet access currently existing in New 
Zealand. As such, the legal protection of internet access is best found within freedom of 
expression. Specifically, internet access is protected within the idea that s 14 of the BORA 
extends to the modes of expression as well as the content.  
A Freedom of Expression  
Section 14 of the BORA is the provision which affirms the right to freedom of expression 
in New Zealand. It provides that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
 
There is no doubt that freedom of expression protects the content of expression, including 
expression which occurs on the internet. This is confirmed by Police v Slater which 
proceeded on the basis that content published on a blog was within the ambit of s 14.15  
Section 14, however, protects more than just the content of expression; the means of 
expression also fall within its ambit. This is shown by the inclusion of the three modes of 
expression, “seek, receive, and impart”.16 This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its 
legislative context, the purpose of the provision, and the broad approach applied in human 
rights law.  
1 Legislative Context  
The language “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information” is not unique to New 
Zealand. The drafters of the BORA drew on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) when 
drafting the BORA. This is apparent in s 14, as the words “seek, receive and impart” can 
also be found in Article 19 of both of the older documents. It is to these documents that 
one must look when interpreting the words “seek, receive, and impart” because there was 
  
15 Slater v New Zealand Police [2011] DCR 6; HC AK CRI 2010-404-379 (10 May 2011) White J, [45] and 
[101] show neither party disagreed, [122-123] shows the judge proceeded on that basis.  
16 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) at 319. 
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little discussion of their meaning in the at the time the Bill was enacted, either in the White 
Paper on the Bill of Rights or by the Select Committee.17  
 
Both the ICCPR18 and the UDHR19 were drafted at a time when there had been international 
emphasis placed on the importance of freedom of information.20 In the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly’s first session it unanimously adopted Resolution 59(I); the United 
Nations Declaration on Freedom of Information.21 This resolution stated that:22 
…freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated; freedom of information implies 
the right to gather, transmit, and publish news anywhere and everywhere without 
fetters.  
The major aim of the UN Conference on Freedom of Information, which New Zealand 
attended, was “improvement in the means of sending information across frontiers in 
accordance with the view … that freedom of information is a fundamental human right”.23  
 
This is the global landscape into which the UDHR and the ICCPR, with their use of “seek, 
receive, and impart”, were enacted. The choice of those words, especially coming from a 
context of international documents affirming the importance of the free, unfettered flow of 
information, indicates an intention to protect not just the content of expression, but also the 
means of expression. This is consistent with the full text of the articles which include the 
  
17 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984-1985] I AJHR A6 at 78-80; 
Jonathon Penney “Open Connectivity, Open Data: Two Dimensions of the Freedom to Seek, Receive and 
Impart Information” (2012) 4 VUWLR Working Paper series at 22-23.  
18 Signed in 1966, drafted in 1954 
19 Signed in 1948 
20 Jonathon Penney “Open Connectivity, Open Data: Two Dimensions of the Freedom to Seek, Receive and 
Impart Information” (2012) 4 VUWLR Working Paper series at 33-39.  
21 Penney, above n 20 at 31; Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information GA Res59(I), 
A/Res/59(I) (1946) 
22 Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information GA Res59(I), A/Res/59(I) (1946) at 
95.  
23 Penney, above n 20 at 33;  as described by John B Whitton who attended the conference: John B Whitton 
“The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and the Movement Against International 
Propaganda” (1949) 43 American Journal of International Law 73 at 73.  
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words “through any media” in the UDHR and “through any other media of his choice” in 
the ICCPR.24  
 
Thus, the words “seek, receive, and impart” have a history substantially longer than the 
1990 birth of the BORA indicates.25 That history, and the importance it placed on the 
medium as well as the content of expression, militate for the inclusion of both medium and 
content within the scope of freedom of expression. 
2 Purpose 
The purpose of s 14 may be drawn from the legislative history it shares with Art 19 in the 
UDHR and the ICCPR, but has also been expounded upon by New Zealand courts and is 
informed by the underlying rationales for freedom of expression.  
 
In New Zealand, freedom of expression has been ascribed the purpose of enhancing 
“democratic self-government” as well as advancing knowledge and revealing truth.26 All 
of these purposes are better served by unfettered flow of information, by and among 
citizens. In today’s society, the internet is the ultimate medium for mass communication 
and the dissemination of information and opinions.27 It follows then, that interpreting 
freedom of expression as extending to a right to internet access is consistent with the 
purpose of s 14.  
 
The rationales underlying freedom of expression also support the free flow of information. 
The marketplace of ideas theory states that the market will reach the correct conclusion or 
“truth” provided it is allowed to function free of external restrictions.28 Permitting state 
  
24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A(III), 10 December 1948, Art 19; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), Art 
19(2).  
25 Penney, above n 20 at 43 -  there is evidence that the drafters of s 14 knew of this history when drafting 
the provision. Several of the key sources listed in the White Paper as its key international authorities discussed 
‘freedom of information” as it was understood in the Post-War period, including the background of Arts 19 
in both the ICCPR and the UDHR.  
26 Rishworth, above n 14 at 45.  
27 Penney, above n 20 at 19. 
28 Butler, above n 16 at 307, at 13.6.3. 
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restriction of internet access is contrary to this theory. One of the criticisms levelled against 
this theory is that the nature of the media will prevent the truth, other than that which the 
media prefers, being accepted.29 In light of this criticism, the role of the internet as an 
impartial, uncensored facilitator becomes even more essential as an antidote. Its ability to 
transmit information form any corner of the globe instantaneously creates a level playing 
field for information, where all ideas compete for general acceptance on their respective 
merits. 
 
A second rationale for freedom of expression is the idea that effective functioning of 
democratic government is premised on freedom of expression.30 The internet is an 
important instrument for uninhibited discussion about the politics of the day; partly because 
it enables anonymity and partly because discussion need not pass the “gatekeeper” of 
mainstream media before being disseminated to the public.31  
 
Two other grounds have been advanced to explain the importance of freedom of 
expression; human self-fulfillment and a societal safety-valve.32 As regards the former, the 
internet allows for new forms of expression, such as social media, .gifs, memes and 
Snapchat, among other internet phenomena.33 These have been strongly adopted by internet 
users with 81% of New Zealand users belonging to a social networking site34 and roughly 
30 million people globally using Snapchat each month.35 While these examples may seem 
trivial, they allow new forms of expression which would not exist in their present states 
without the internet, in turn increasing the options for self-fulfillment through expression. 
In terms of the latter argument, the internet provides a forum for open and often anonymous 
discussion of ideas. This prevents ideas being driven underground and becoming 
  
29 Butler, above n 16 at 308, at 13.6.6.  
30 Butler, above n 16 at 308, at 13.6.7. 
31 Stephen Thomson “Protecting Legitimate Speech Online: Does the Net work?” (LLB(Hons) Dissertation, 
University of Otago, 2012)  at 3.  
32 Butler, above n 16 at 309. 
33 www.9gag.com is an enlightening website for both .gifs and memes.  
34 Crothers, above n 4 at 17. 
35 Alyson Shontell “The Truth About Snapchat’s Active Users (The Numbers The Company Doesn’t Want 
You To See” (2013) Business Insider www.businessinsider.com  
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conspiracies. The societal safety-valve argument may be aimed at protecting the content of 
expression, but the breadth of the internet, and its anonymity, permit people to discuss all 
ideas without fear of social repercussions.  
3 Broad Approach 
The language of the BORA is intentionally general to indicate the fundamental nature of 
the rights and allow specification by the interpreter when determining the scope of each 
right in the particular circumstances.36 The courts have traditionally taken advantage of 
this, by adopting a broad approach when interpreting the scope of rights.37 This judicial 
desire to give rights the least restrictive interpretation possible is exemplified in the Court 
of Appeal’s interpretation of s 14 in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review as 
being “as wide as human thought and imagination”.38 The broad interpretative approach is 
in accordance with the treatment of human rights instruments internationally.39  
 
The inclusion of the means of expression within the ambit of freedom of expression, 
including the protection of internet access, is required by the broad approach. It is also an 
interpretation which is available on the language of the section; “seek, receive, and impart” 
are not stretched too far by an interpretation which includes a right to internet access.  
4 Conclusion on the Interpretation of s 14 
The BORA is subject to a broad and purposive interpretative approach.40 Accordingly, 
interpreting s 14 to extend its protection to a right to internet access is either consistent 
with, or essential to, the various rationales and purposes underlying freedom of expression. 
It is also in line with the broad approach, the legislative history and the language of the 
provision. There is also international support for the protection of internet access as a right, 
qualified both as a positive obligation on the state and as a freedom from state interference 
  
36 Rishworth, above n 14 at 43. 
37 Rishworth, above n 14 at 43; see Ministry of Transport v Noort CA 369/91 [1992] NZCA 51 
38 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) at [15]; also Butler above n 16 at 
311. 
39 Steven Greer “The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or 
Margin of Appreciation” (2010) 3 UCL Human Rights Review 1 at 6.  
40 Rishworth, above n 14 at 43.  
11  
 
held by citizens. This support, and the reasons that internet access should be conceptualised 
as a freedom in New Zealand, will be discussed shortly.  
 
In this context it is also helpful to consider the situation in the negative: if s 14 did not 
include a right to internet access, and that access was then restricted, to what extent would 
this render the words “freedom to seek, receive, and impart” meaningless? If some 
information is only accessible online, and individuals are restricted from accessing the 
internet, then the fact that they have the right to seek and receive that information becomes 
meaningless. It is the case in today’s society that some information is only available online. 
For example, if an individual wished to view one of the myriad of videos on YouTube, or 
research academic literature from a foreign university, those are both types of information 
that would be easily accessible online but practically impossible to obtain without internet 
access. That the individual has a right to fruitlessly seek the information must be cold 
comfort indeed.  
B Right or Freedom: Is there a positive obligation on the government? 
Rights can be conceptualised in two ways: ‘negative’ rights or freedoms require the 
government to refrain from action that interferes with the right, while ‘positive’ rights 
require the government to act, or provide a service, in order to satisfy the right.41 Either 
would mean that judicial restrictions on internet access in sentencing are contrary to 
freedom of expression, however the author argues that only the right to access the internet 
free from state interference exists in New Zealand, and not a positive obligation on the 
government.  
 
Freedom of expression itself is framed as a negative right, and although the government 
has been encouraged to facilitate it, it has no explicit obligation to provide fora for public 
expression.42 It would thus be unusual to qualify internet access as a positive obligation on 
  
41 Aeon Skoble “Positive Rights vs. Negative Rights” (29 June 2011) Learn Liberty www.learnliberty.org  
42 See F. La Rue’s report for an example of encouragement, above n 3; Butler, above n 16 at 322 re: no duty 
to provide fora. Also note that there is growing sentiment that in order to promote and facilitate freedom of 
expression there may be a developing argument for a positive obligation on the state to provide access to 
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the government, where it is protected by a negatively framed right, which confers no such 
obligation. It is also worth noting that the drafting history of the BORA explicitly omits 
socio-economic or ‘positive’ rights, so it falls within the overall scheme of the Act to 
qualify the right to internet access as a freedom from government interference.43 Butler and 
Butler state that the right to seek information does not mean that the state has to make a 
certain medium available.44  
 
Conceptualising internet access as a freedom, rather than a right is consistent with the 
purposes of s 14, identified earlier. The freedom to access the internet conforms to 
maintaining the effective functioning of democracy and the advancement of truth. The 
freedom of access is sufficient to meet those purposes in New Zealand, though in other, 
less developed states that conclusion may differ. This is because New Zealand already has 
high levels of internet access and most public libraries have computers capable of accessing 
the internet available for public use. State restriction of internet access, as a condition in 
sentencing for example, will still be a breach of s 14 even where the right of internet access 
is qualified as freedom from state interference rather than as a positive obligation.  
C International Approach 
Human rights attach to people because they are human, not because they are citizens of a 
particular state.45 Therefore, it is pertinent to consider how other countries have treated 
freedom of expression and the issue of whether its ambit includes protection of the means 
of expression, specifically internet, when interpreting the right in New Zealand.  
  
means of communication, but the author believes that it does not yet exist in New Zealand for the reasons 
given and it is outside of the scope of this paper.  
43 Penney, above n 20 at 46. 
44 Butler, above n 16 at 319.  
45 Susy Frankel (ed), and others Learning from the Past, Adapting for the Future: Regulatory Reform in New 
Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 9.3.1(d).  
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5 Case Law 
In New Zealand there is scant case law about the scope of the “freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information” and whether it includes a right of access to any mediums.46 
Federated Farmers of New Zealand held that s 14 included the freedom to send and receive 
mail, demonstrating a judicial acceptance of the freedom to access a means of expression 
as within the words of s 14.47 Morse v The Police continues in this vein by saying that 
protest and the right to protest in an effective way are aspects of freedom of speech, and 
that it is legitimate for those wishing to protest to make choices regarding the most effective 
way of doing so.48 This supports the idea that the means of expression are protected from 
state interference, including an individual’s choice as to the most effective means.  
 
Conversely, Ransfield establishes that the right to impart information does not contain the 
right to an audience.49 However, this is not inherently contrary to the protection of internet 
access within s 14, or the preceding cases, it simply outlines the distinction between a right 
conferring a positive obligation on the state, and one requiring the state not to interfere with 
the right. Ransfield is correctly interpreted as holding that the state need not provide 
citizens with the means to impart information, which in that case was access to a radio 
station. However, this has no impact on the right to access mediums of expression, such as 
the internet, free from state interference, which is consistent with Federated Farmers and 
Morse.  
 
Internationally, there has been more judicial exploration of whether the “freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information” confers a right to access a medium of expression. In 
Germany, the Bavarian Constitutional Court held that a council ban on satellite dishes 
where there was no other adequate television reception was an infringement of freedom of 
expression.50 This indicates that where there is only one medium for expression, the 
  
46 Penney, above n 20 at 19.  
47 Federated Farmers of New Zealand v New Zealand Post Ltd CP No 661/92 [1992] at 55; Rishworth, above 
n 14 at 311.  
48 Morse v The Police [2011] NZSC 45 at [108].  
49 Ransfield v Radio Network Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 233 at [34]; see also Butler above n 16 at 322.  
50 BayVerfGH. DOV 1986, 72, 74 see Butler, above n 16 at 319.  
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freedom to access that medium is contained within the ambit of freedom of expression. 
This is consistent with the situation outlined in the negative above; it indicates that where 
a government restriction on access to a medium would make the rights held by citizens 
hollow, access to that medium is protected.51  
 
This reasoning is affirmed in another German case with a similar result where a landlord 
refused a Turkish tenant’s request to install a satellite dish in order to access Turkish 
television and radio. There the court held that the landlord must allow the satellite dish as 
it was the only way for the tenant to access the information.52  
 
In Autronic v Switzerland the court held that the Swiss authority’s refusal to allow a 
company to receive a satellite broadcast of a television program was a violation of the 
company’s right to receive information.53 There, the European Court of Human Rights 
stated that:54   
…[freedom of expression] applies not only to the content of information but also to 
the means of transmission or reception since any restriction imposed on the means 
necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information. 
The court then clarified that the reception of television programs by means of an aerial 
came within freedom of expression without it being necessary to establish the purpose for 
which the right was exercised.55  
 
Thus the European Court of Human Rights’ position on article 10, which protects the right 
to “receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority”, can 
be said to include a right not to be impeded in one’s efforts to access available 
information.56 This is consistent with the interpretation of s 14 of the NZBORA including 
a right to internet access free from state interference. 
  
51 See ‘Conclusion on the Interpretation of s 14’ above.  
52 BVerfG NJW 1994, 1147 see Butler, above n 16 at 320. 
53 Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHHR 485 (ECHR).  
54 Autronic AG v Switzerland above n 53 at [47].  
55 Autronic AG v Switzerland above n 53 at [47].  
56 Butler, above n 16 at 320. 
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France offers the first case where freedom of expression was used to protect internet access 
from government interference. In 2009 the Conseil Constitutionnel found a copyright 
infringement law (known as HADOPI), which allowed the government to cut off citizens’ 
internet access for repeat copyright infringements, to be an unconstitutional restriction on 
citizens’ right to free expression and communication.57 However, the Conseil did not 
qualify internet access as a right, but as a condition for the enjoyment of freedom of 
communication, stating that:58 
‘…in the current state of the means of communication and given the generalized 
development of public online communication services and the importance of the latter 
for participation in democracy … [freedom of expression] implies freedom to access 
such services’.  
 
A decision by the Costa Rican Constitutional Court in 2010 followed and referred to the 
French decision. The judgment acknowledged the importance of information technologies 
for facilitating the exercise of fundamental rights and democratic participation, then went 
further by affirming a fundamental right that covers access to such technologies, namely, 
the right of access to the internet.59  It described this right as a “constitutional right of access 
to new information technologies”.60  
 
These international cases largely arose due to insufficient access to a medium of 
communication, which as I have mentioned earlier is not at issue in New Zealand in regards 
to the internet.61 However, they still stand as authority that where there is no other means 
of accessing information, access to a particular medium will be protected under freedom 
of expression. As the internet will at times be the only means of accessing information, 
  
57 Penney, above n 20 at 3;  
58 Decision no. 2009-580 Act furthering the diffusion and protection of creation on the Internet (2009) The 
Constitutional Council at [12]. Also see Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen 1789 (France), Art 
11.  
59 Andres Oviedo Guzman v Ministerio de Ambiente, Energia y Telecommunicaciones No. 2010-012790, July 
30 2010, Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica [Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court] (Costa Rica) at [V].  
60 Guzman v Ministerio de Ambiente, Energia y Telecommunicaciones, above n 59  at [V].   
61 See ‘Right or Freedom: is there a positive obligation on the government’ above.  
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these cases support an interpretation of s 14 that protects internet access from state 
interference. Furthermore, in the only cases which considered internet access broadly, 
rather than access to a medium for a specific purpose, the courts held that a general right 
to internet access existed, either as a freedom from state interference within freedom of 
expression or as a right in itself.62 This indicates that where courts are made to face the 
issue of internet access broadly, and state restrictions thereof, they are willing to step up 
and hold that internet access in general, not just for specific information which is otherwise 
inaccessible, is protected from state interference under freedom of expression.   
6 Statute 
International statutes are also important when considering whether freedom of expression 
includes an implied right to internet access because they indicate the importance placed on 
internet access as a right globally. Internationally, there have been two main ways of 
protecting internet access: by legislative affirmation of internet access as a right, or by 
enacting a statutory Universal Service Doctrine.  
 
Only a few recent constitutions have specific provisions concerning access to 
telecommunications mediums.  Greece was the first country to constitutionally recognize 
the right to participate in the information society, including by access to electronically 
transmitted information, 63 and was followed in 2003 by Honduras, which amended the 
constitution to recognise a right to access personal information by any medium.64 
Ecuador’s constitution is the most explicit and protects the right to access information and 
communication technologies.65  
 
The Universal Service Doctrine refers to the practice of providing a base uniform level of 
services to every citizen of a country, regardless of location.66 It was created for other 
public services but has been applied to internet access in Estonia and Finland. Article 5 of 
  
62 The French and Costa Rican cases referred to.  
63 The Constitution of Greece 1975 (Amended 2001), Art 5A.  
64 Constitution of Honduras 1982 (Amended 2003), Art 182.  
65 Constitution of Ecuador 2008, Art 16.   
66 See Federal Communications Commission “Universal Service” (2014) www.fcc.gov  
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the Estonian Telecommunications Act requires that internet is universally available to 
citizens regardless of localisation and at a uniform cost.67 Finland passed similar legislation 
in 2009, going even further by specifying the minimum speed of access that must be 
provided.68  
 
Statutory protections, particularly constitutional ones, are likely to be less common than 
cases affirming the importance of internet access and its value as a right. The reasons for 
this are twofold. First, only constitutions and Bills of Rights which have been drafted since 
the advent of the internet and the recognition of its importance are likely to have included 
explicit references to the internet. Secondly, legislation is a slow process. Governments are 
less likely to enact statutes protecting internet access, and thus potentially take upon 
themselves positive obligations to provide such access, without careful and lengthy 
consideration, and either a perceived need or public demand. Therefore, despite the fact 
that there are few examples of explicit statutory protection of internet access, the existence 
of statutory  protection at all, and the range of countries where it is found go some way to 
demonstrate the international acknowledgement of the importance of internet access and 
its role as a right. 
 
III State Restriction of Internet Access 
D Infringement of s 14 
Infringement of s 14 will occur when a judge imposes a special condition restricting 
internet access in the course of sentencing an offender. This will generally only occur when 
the internet has played a role in the offending. The Sentencing Act 2002 allows for special 
conditions to be imposed in specific circumstances, where the offender is being sentenced 
  
67 Telecommunications Act 2000 (Estonia), Art 5. The provision is enforceable against ISPs, who are required 
to guarantee access to all citizens. This has been practically successful with Estonia having some of the 
highest rates of access globally.  
68 Communications Market Act 2009 (Finland), Art 60: providers must guarantee users an appropriate 
internet connection (broadband) at their domicile at reasonable cost without discrimination based on location. 
Communications authority (FICORA) tasked with verifying costs applied by providers. Standard is 1mb/s 
everywhere.  
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to supervision, intensive supervision, home detention, imprisonment of not more than 24 
months or post-detention conditions.69 Except in the case of imprisonment, these conditions 
may only be imposed if the court is satisfied that: 70 
(a) There is a significant risk of further offending by the offender; and 
(b) Standard conditions alone would not adequately reduce that risk; and 
(c) The imposition of special conditions would reduce the likelihood of further 
offending by the offender through the rehabilitation and reintegration of the 
offender.  
In all of the above cases, again with the exception of imprisonment, a subsection allows 
the imposition of “any other conditions that the court thinks fit to reduce the likelihood of 
further offending by the offender”.71  
Under these provisions, a judge may make an order restricting internet access if he or she 
believes that there is a significant risk of further offending by the offender which standard 
conditions alone would not address, and that the restriction of internet access would reduce 
the likelihood of further offending by the offender through their rehabilitation and 
reintegration.  
Section 93 applies where an offender is released from short-term imprisonment. It allows 
a court to impose special conditions on the offender if they are designed to:72 
(a) Reduce the risk of reoffending by the offender; or 
(b) Facilitate or promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender; or 
(c) Provide for the reasonable concerns of victims of the offender. 
Section 15(3) of the Parole Act 2002 gives a non-exhaustive list of special conditions, 
introduced by the words “special condition[s] include, without limitation –“. Therefore a 
special condition restricting internet access is within the law for a judge to impose 
  
69 Sentencing Act 2002 , ss 52, 54I, 80D, 80P and 93.  
70 Sentencing Act 2002, ss 80P(1), 80D(2), 52(1), 54I(1).  
71 Sentencing Act 2002, ss 80P(2)(d); s 80D(4)(e); s 52(2)(c); s 54I(3)(e).  
72 Sentencing Act 2002, s 93(3), note ‘short term’ means 12 months or less.  
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following short-term imprisonment, as was done in Bowers v Department of Corrections.73 
However, where the condition restricting internet access is an apparent infringement of s 
14 and it is not legitimised by s 5 it will be unlawful for a judge to impose that condition 
on an offender. This is because when exercising their discretion judges are bound to 
consider and follow the BORA.74 
E Possible Restrictions 
Before considering the legality of restrictions, it is important to know what they might 
consist of. In the United States courts have made various orders restricting internet access: 
in some cases this has involved a total ban from internet access; in others, a partial ban has 
been applied.75 The United Kingdom also has some case history of internet restrictions. 
These have included: not to possess any form of internet access without informing the 
police; not to use any computer which does not retain the internet history and not to refuse 
to show such history to a police officer on request, and; not to use the internet for any 
purpose other than employment, study, work, lawful recreation or the purchase of goods or 
services.76 
Total bans, as the name suggests, involve a complete restriction of any internet access 
including from computers, smart phones and tablets. Partial bans are anything less, and 
may involve allowing the offender to access only specific websites, restricting the offender 
to use of a specified computer, requiring internet access only under the supervision of a 
specified person, or any other restriction on internet access which is less than a total ban.  
In a recent New Zealand case the offender was ordered not to access, use or be in the 
possession of any equipment capable of accessing the internet without the prior written 
approval of his probation officer.77 In other New Zealand cases offenders have been 
ordered not to use or possess internet-capable devices unless supervised by an approved 
  
73 Bowers v Department of Corrections Wellington CRI-2011-485-12, 5 April 2011 at [3].  
74 Rishworth above n 14 at 141. 
75 Cheryl Krause and Luke Pazicky “An Un-Standard Condition: Restricting Internet Use as a Condition of 
Supervised Release” (2008) 20 WCSL 201 at 201-202.  
76 R v Smith [2011] EWCA Crim 1772 at [19].  
77 R v Needham [2014] NZHC 736 at [83].  
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adult, to provide access to any electronic devices for the purpose of a control officer 
checking compliance with special conditions, and not to enter any retail outlet that sells 
electronic equipment.78  
F Section 5 Analysis 
The ad hoc balancing approach advocates a two-stage process of defining the rights 
broadly, regardless of competing considerations, and then determining the reasonableness 
of any limitations separately in an application of s 5.79  Section 14 has been broadly defined 
above as including the right to access the internet free from state interference.  
Section 5 states:80 
Justified limitations – subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
7 Prescribed by Law 
Section 5 requires that any limits placed on a right must be prescribed by law. “Prescribed 
by law” means that limits must not be arbitrary and must be clearly accessible.81 According 
to the Ministry of Justice’s summary of case annotations, a law that confers a discretion on 
an official to act in derogation of a right will satisfy the prescribed by law requirement, so 
long as the discretion is constrained by legal standards.82 Where a judge imposes a special 
condition restricting internet access, they are exercising the discretion conferred upon them 
by the Sentencing Act. As described above, judges may only impose special conditions 
subject to certain requirements outlined in the Sentencing Act.83 Thus, a restriction of 
  
78 Wilson v New Zealand Parole Board [2013] NZHC 1789  at [5];  Bowers v Department of Corrections 
above n 73 at [4]. 
79 Butler above n 16 at 120. 
80 The Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5.  
81 Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [180].  
82 Ministry of Justice “NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990: Summary of Case Annotations Ministry of Justice – 
Section 5” (1997) www.justice.govt.nz; this is consistent with Rishworth’s commentary which notes that 
limits may arise by implication, Rishworth above n 24 at 175.  
83 See ‘Infringement of s 14’ above.  
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internet access imposed as a special condition in accordance with the Sentencing Act will 
constitute a limit on freedom of expression which is prescribed by law.  
8 Demonstrably Justified in a Free and Democratic Society 
Tipping J in R v Hansen outlined the s 5 methodology as raising two issues. The first is 
whether the limiting measures serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment 
of the right or freedom. The second he split into three parts; whether the limiting measure 
is rationally connected to its purpose; whether the limiting measure impairs the right or 
freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose, 
and; whether the limit is in due proportion to the importance of the objective.84 I will assess 
these in turn.  
 
(a) Does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify the 
curtailment of freedom of expression? 
The purposes of a restriction of internet access in the case of internet related crime are 
largely to be found in the principles of sentencing. Restricting the internet access of an 
offender, either fully or in part, is likely to protect the public and reduce or prevent 
recidivism by aiding the rehabilitation of the offender and possibly acting as a deterrent on 
others who rely on the internet and are considering using it in the pursuit of crime.85 The 
option for a judge to restrict internet access may also allow for a community sentence in 
some cases where, due to the nature of the offending, the judge may otherwise feel 
compelled to sentence a term of imprisonment.  
In terms of prevention of future offending, this consideration gains significance when the 
harm considered is something in the realm of child pornography, or blackmail, rather than 
other cybercrime. This is because those crimes are not ‘victimless’ and the harm is more 
  
84 Hansen v R above n 81 at [104].  
85 Krause and Pazicky above n 75 at 203.  
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than financial. Other jurisdictions have also imposed access restrictions where there were 
risks to national security posed by offenders through their internet use.86  
It is essential to note that the importance of the purpose of preventing further crime will 
vary in each case depending on factors such as the nature of the risk and the severity of the 
restriction. While in some circumstances that purpose may be sufficient to justify some 
curtailing freedom of expression, in others it will fall short. As has been belaboured by 
many an academic: it all depends on the facts of the case.  
 
(b) Rational Connection 
The restriction of internet access in the case of internet-related crimes as a means of 
preventing further crime of the same type is rationally connected with its purpose. Without 
internet access, or with restricted access, perpetrators will be less able to reoffend using the 
internet. As their offending was internet-based previously, it follows that the restrictions 
will be effective in reducing their likelihood of reoffending. 
 
(c) Does the limiting measure impair the freedom no more than is reasonably necessary 
for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
In his application of s 5 in Hansen, Tipping described this inquiry in practical terms as 
involving consideration of “whether Parliament might have sufficiently achieved its 
objective by another method involving less cost to the [right infringed]”.87 In the case of 
internet access, full and partial restrictions may be placed in the alternative as methods for 
reducing internet-based crime. Supervision and rehabilitation programs are also sentencing 
options, and do not impair freedom of expression.  
Full and partial access restrictions would both reduce the likelihood of the offender 
committing more internet-based crimes. A total access restriction evidently impairs 
  
86 Alasdair Henderson “National security concerns do trump human rights, sometimes” (2011) UK Human 
Rights Blog www.ukhumanrightsblog.com  
87 Hansen v R above n 81 at [126]. 
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freedom of expression to the largest degree. Consequently it should be avoided except 
where it is necessary to sufficiently prevent or reduce internet-based crime. Whether it is 
necessary will depend on the circumstances of the case. In the case of terrorism aided by 
internet-use, such as in AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department, an absolute or 
near absolute restriction on internet access may be necessary to prevent the harm occurring 
at all.88 Conversely, an American article which considers American case law on the subject, 
argues that:89  
…as a legal matter, in most cases, banning cyber criminals from ever using the internet 
restricts their liberty more than is necessary to protect society. Prophylactic 
conditions… can protect the public as effectively as a ban.   
In cases of first time, or minor offending, or where it is appropriate for other reasons, 
supervision or rehabilitation programs may be effective in preventing further internet-
based crime. Where this is the case these methods must be applied as they do not infringe 
s 14, and judges are obliged to act consistently with the BORA where possible. In situations 
where the offender is unsophisticated with computers and unlikely to circumvent the 
restriction, or where the potential harm is less extreme, a partial restriction may be 
sufficient to reduce or prevent the harm.  
Thus, the method which will sufficiently prevent further internet-based offending, while 
infringing on freedom of expression as little as possible, will depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case. Terrorism, where it is imperative to prevent any future offences 
due to their gravity, or cybercrimes, where the offender is likely to circumvent lesser 
measures, may require the order of a total access restriction in order to sufficiently achieve 
their respective purposes. In cases where supervision or rehabilitation are inappropriate, a 
partial restriction may be necessary to sufficiently prevent reoffending. It is likely that the 
majority cases would require only a partial, or no, access restriction in order to reduce the 
likelihood of reoffending. Only the cases of the utmost severity involving immense harm, 
or repeat offending and technological sophistication may require a full access restriction in 
order to prevent reoffending.  
  
88 AM v The Secretary for the Home Department above n 12, at [106].  
89 Krause and Pazicky above at n 75 at [203].   
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(d) Proportionality 
The proportionality inquiry involves consideration of whether the limit is in due proportion 
to the importance of the objective. The United Kingdom Court of Appeal has said that a 
blanket prohibition on internet access is impermissible in the context of child 
pornography.90 The court added that it is disproportionate because it restricts the defendant 
in the use of what is nowadays an essential part of everyday living for a large proportion 
of the public. It likened such a prohibition to banning an offender from all printed material 
because he was found with pictures of child pornography.  However, the British High Court 
in another case found that a near-total internet restriction was proportionate where it related 
to national security.91 
A consideration of those decisions together indicates that in the United Kingdom protecting 
the public from “serious sexual harm” is not sufficiently important to justify a total ban 
from internet access,92 whereas protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism 
is.93 This underlines both the stringent standard required by the proportionality inquiry and 
the sometimes slight distinction between the proportionate and disproportionate, as no one 
would suggest that either of those objectives was lacking in importance. An American case 
demonstrates the approach in less serious cases, where a review court found a thirty-year 
total computer ban to be unreasonable in light of the fact that no one was actually harmed 
as a result of the crime.94  
 American commentators Krause and Pazicky argue that “in all but the most extreme cases, 
ordering a total ban defies law, equity and sound public policy”.95 The author proposes that 
this is the correct approach, if somewhat dramatically worded. A total access restriction 
infringes so much on the right to freedom of expression that only in the most extreme cases, 
  
90 R v Smith above n 76 at [20]i.   
91 AM v The Secretary for the Home Department above n 12, at [120]. 
92 R v Smith above n 76 at [6]. 
93 AM v The Secretary for the Home Department above n 12, at [9].  
94 United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 2010) at 637.  
95 Krause and Pazicky above at n 75 at [203].   
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where the objective is imperative, will it be proportionate. Nevertheless, more tailored 
restrictions may well be proportionate to the objective of preventing reoffending. Child 
pornography, cyberstalking, and blackmail are not trivial crimes, and their prevention is an 
important aim.  
9 Conclusion on s 5 
A total internet restriction is a prima facie breach of s 14 and will remain so except in the 
most extreme cases where it may be justified under s 5. Protecting national security 
interests may be one case where a total access restriction may be justified. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the restriction must be both necessary and proportionate. In 
the case of cybercriminals with advanced computer knowledge, a full restriction may be 
necessary to prevent circumventing lesser restrictions and thus reoffending, but it may not 
be proportionate to the objective.   
Lesser restrictions will more easily be legitimised by s 5, as necessary and proportionate 
and therefore justified. This is consistent with the purposes of s 14 as partial restrictions 
are likely to most severely limit reoffending, while only somewhat interfering with the 
offender’s ability to participate in New Zealand’s democracy or to send and receive 
legitimate information.  
G Section 6 
Relying on Tipping J’s approach in Hansen, where a provision infringing on a right fails 
to be legitimised by s 5, the courts must consider whether there is a rights-consistent 
interpretation of that provision available.  
The provisions of the Sentencing Act relating to special conditions are at issue in this case, 
and have been outlined above. These provisions do not explicitly empower judges to 
restrict internet access as a special condition; they do, however, leave open to the 
sentencing judge the power to impose any condition they think fit, so long as it meets 
certain conditions. On its language, internet access restrictions can easily be read into the 
Sentencing Act as special conditions. However, it is equally possible for a court to interpret 
the Act as implicitly excluding conditions that unjustifiably infringe the rights of the 
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individual being sentenced. The latter approach seems to be required by s 6, in fact, which 
states:96 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning.  
When Parliament enacted the Sentencing Act, it must have intended to infringe on human 
rights to some extent. The nature of the Act is to impose penalties on criminals, including 
imprisonment which severely impacts on multiple human rights including freedom of 
movement and liberty of the person. However, it is reasonable to interpret the Act as not 
empowering the imposition of sentences which unjustifiably limit the rights found in the 
BORA, unless explicitly stated. The provisions relating to special conditions, which have 
been relied on to impose internet restrictions in New Zealand, do not thus empower special 
conditions which constitute unjustified limitations to human rights, specifically the right to 
freedom of expression including the right to access the internet free from state interference.  
 
IV Practical Considerations 
Even where a judge legitimately orders the restriction of access, its implementation still 
stands in issue. There are various practical considerations which may prove problematic 
when imposing special conditions restricting internet access.  
Partial restrictions involving unannounced hard drive inspections or monitoring software 
are very achievable technologically, but may increase the costs on the government.97 The 
added costs may consist of training parole officers, buying the software or simply the extra 
man-hours spent in enforcing them. A sentencing judge may order the offender to pay for 
software themselves, but a technologically savvy offender may be able to overcome any 
partial restrictions placed on them. For someone experienced with computers, the most 
effective way to enforce a restriction might be by cooperating with an Internet Service 
  
96 The Bill of Rights Act 1990 , s 6. 
97 Krause and Pazicky above at n 75 at [203].   
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Provider, but this may prove impractical if restrictions are employed often and for short 
time-periods.  
Does this then advocate full restrictions for cybercriminals? A full restriction may be easier 
to enforce, requiring only the assurance of no internet access, something parole officers 
will be more easily able to recognise. However, a full restriction has a much more serious 
effect on the life of the offender, significantly intruding on his or her right to freedom of 
expression. Is it possible to justify such an approach to economic or intellectual property 
crimes, when a lesser restriction might be applied to offenders in victim-based crimes, such 
as possession of child pornography, or cyber-stalking, purely because they are less likely 
to circumvent restrictions? These are questions that will need to be faced head-on by any 
judge ordering an internet restriction. Account must also be taken of the effect a total access 
restriction would have on the offender’s ability to take part in society, for example through 
social media and news sites, even attending university, and also the effect on other 
members of the household. A significant restriction on one’s ability to take part in 
important aspects of society may lead to anti-social behaviour and reoffending. For a 
person trained in the Information Technology industry, a total ban would seriously impair 
their ability to get a job in that field, and, if paired with a fine, may also contribute to 
recidivism as a form of economic survival. In fact, many professions now require internet 
use and so total bans would seriously impair an offender’s ability to get a professional job. 
It is also relevant to note the courts’ lack of technological expertise. Judges may not be best 
placed to understand the practicalities of an internet restriction. This increases the 
importance of counsel in sentencing hearings as a source of information for the judge. It 
also indicates the judges making these orders should perhaps undertake some information 
technology training to better understand the realities, or obtain advice from someone 
experienced in the field.   
 
V Conclusion 
In New Zealand s 14 protects the mode of expression alongside the content, as shown by 
the inclusion of the words “seek, receive and impart”. Citizens’ access to the internet is 
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thus protected from state interference by the BORA, although this protection does not go 
so far as to oblige the state to provide internet access for the New Zealand public. This 
interpretation is consistent with the historical legislative context of freedom of expression, 
the broad and purposive interpretation afforded to human rights, the underlying rationales 
for freedom of expression as well as New Zealand and international case law. It is also in 
accord with growing international sentiment about the importance of unrestrained internet 
access, shown in the increasing reliance of people and organisations, including 
governments, on the internet, and the international move towards protecting access whether 
by specific legislation or UN reports.  
Judicial restrictions of internet access as a special condition of sentencing are apparent 
infringements of freedom of expression. Partial restrictions of internet access may be 
justifiable where they are aimed at preventing reoffending and are proportionate to that 
aim, but total restrictions, though a possibility, are unlikely to be proportionate in anything 
but cases of the most egregious offending. This is because of the negative impact that a 
total restriction would likely have on the ability of an individual to participate in society. 
Where a judge has imposed an unjustified restriction of internet access an offender may 
appeal and have the condition revoked on the basis that it is contrary to the BORA.  
To date, in the New Zealand cases where internet restrictions have been imposed in 
sentencing, there appears to have been no judicial discussion about the infringement of 
freedom of expression, or proportionality in that regard. This is concerning as transparency 
is particularly important in the field of human rights, and because it appears there has been 
no judicial consideration of whether orders restricting internet access do, in fact, infringe 
on freedom of expression and are thus unlawful. There are also various considerations 
about the practical implementation of such conditions that will need to be explored further 
if the use of internet restrictions in sentencing continue and develop in New Zealand. 
Going forward, New Zealand could follow in the footsteps of Estonia and Finland and 
adopt a Universal Service Doctrine, or explicitly recognise a right to internet access in 
statute. Any reform would be able to clarify the extent of the right to internet access, and 
whether it created a positive obligation on the government to provide public access. The 
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Green Party has launched an ‘Internet Rights Bill’ which proposes to guarantee internet 
access to citizens as one of its rights, but this has not yet become New Zealand law.98 
Regardless of possible reforms, there is a global shift towards recognition of the internet 
as an important medium of communication which foretells an increasing acceptance of a 
right to internet access and greater scrutiny of state restrictions to access. 
  
98Internet Rights and Freedoms Bill (Draft Bill), s 12 
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